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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Torrey Lee Friedrich appeals from his convictions for driving under the 
influence and grand theft. Specifically, he challenges the denial of his motion to 
suppress in the driving under the influence case and asserts the district court 
abused its sentencing discretion in both cases. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of the Proceedings 
Friedrich was arrested in his driveway for driving on a suspended license. 
(Tr., p.38, L.21 - p.39, L.24.) Following further investigation, including obtaining 
Friedrich's breath alcohol content of .092/.091, the state charged Friedrich with 
felony driving under the influence (enhanced by two prior convictions for driving 
under the influence), DWP and possession of an open container. (R., pp.52-53.) 
The state also charged Friedrich with being a persistent violator. (R., pp.58-59.) 
Friedrich filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained in his driving 
under the influence case, claiming he had been "illegally stopped, detained and 
questioned." (R., pp.80-82.) Following a hearing, the district court denied 
Friedrich's motion to suppress. (Tr., p.47, L.24 - p.48, L.1.) 
The state charged Friedrich in an unrelated case with grand theft by 
possession after he was found with stolen computer equipment and a stolen 
camera in his vehicle. (R., pp.150-151.) 
In a global resolution, Friedrich entered conditional guilty pleas to felony 
driving under the influence and grand theft by possession with the state 
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withdrawing the persistent violator enhancement on the driving under the 
influence case and agreeing not to file a persistent violator enhancement and 
dismissing remaining charges on the grand theft case. (Tr., p.58, L.14 - p.59, 
L.5; R., pp.108-117, 153-160.) As part of the plea agreement, Friedrich 
preserved the right to appeal the adverse ruling on his motion to suppress. (Tr., 
p.58, Ls.14-17; R., pp.109-110.) Further, as part of the agreement, the state 
bound itself to a recommendation of four years fixed followed by six years 
indeterminate on the driving under the influence charge and four years fixed 
followed by 10 years indeterminate on the grand theft charge, to be served 
concurrently, with Friedrich able to argue for a lesser sentence. (Tr., p.59, Ls.13-
25.) 
The district court imposed concurrent unified sentences of three years 
fixed followed by seven years indeterminate and recommended that Friedrich be 
placed in the Therapeutic Community. (Tr., p.90, Ls.12-21; R., pp.123-125, 167-
169.) Friedrich timely appeals. (R., pp.119-122, 164-166.) 
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ISSUES 
Friedrich states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Whether the district court erred when it denied Mr. 
Friedrich's motion to suppress because the officer did not 
have reasonable suspicion to justify the warrantless 
detention of Mr. Friedrich. 
2. Whether the district court abused its discretion by imposing 
excessive sentences on Mr. Friedrich in the two cases on 
appeal. 
(Appellant's brief, p.9.) 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
1. Has Friedrich failed to show that the district court erred in denying his 
suppression motion? 
2. Has Friedrich failed to establish that the district court abused its 
discretion by imposing concurrent sentences of three years fixed followed by 
seven years indeterminate upon his pleas of guilty to felony driving under the 




Friedrich Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred In Denying His 
Suppression Motion 
A. Introduction 
The district court denied Friedrich's motion to suppress. (Tr., p.47, L.24 -
p.48, L.1.) Friedrich argues on appeal that the district court erred in denying his 
motion to suppress because his initial detention was not based on reasonable 
suspicion. (Appellant's brief, pp.10-11.) Friedrich's claim fails. A review of the 
record, in light of the applicable legal standards, supports the conclusion that the 
officer had sufficient cause to detain Friedrich and determine if he was driving on 
a suspended driver's license. As such, the district court did not err when it 
denied Friedrich's motion to suppress. 
B. Standard Of Review 
On review of a ruling on a motion to suppress, the appellate court defers 
to the trial court's findings of fact unless clearly erroneous but exercises free 
review of the trial court's determination as to whether constitutional standards 
have been satisfied in light of the facts. State v. Willoughby, 147 Idaho 482, 485-
6, 211 P.3d 91, 94-95 (2009); State v. Fees, 140 Idaho 81, 84, 90 P.3d 306, 309 
(2004). 
The interpretation and construction of a statute present questions of law 
over which the appellate court exercises free review. State v. Thompson, 140 
Idaho 796,798,102 P.3d 1115, 1117 (2004); State v. Dorn, 140 Idaho 404,405, 
94 P.3d 709, 710 (Ct. App. 2004). 
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C. Friedrich Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred In Denying 
His Motion To Suppress 
Seizures of the person are evaluated under a Fourth Amendment 
standard of reasonableness. Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 697-700 
(1981). Generally, any seizure of a person, whether by arrest or detention, must 
be supported by probable cause. 15;L_ at 700; Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 
200, 208 (1979). There are, however, certain exceptions to the probable cause 
requirement. For example, it is well-settled that a police officer may, in 
compliance with the Fourth Amendment, make an investigatory stop of an 
individual if that officer entertains a reasonable suspicion that a person has 
committed, or is about to commit, a crime. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30-31 
(1968); State v. Bishop. 146 Idaho 804,811,203 P.3d 1203, 1210 (2009) (citing 
Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 498 (1983)). 
In determining whether reasonable suspicion exists, the Court must 
consider the officer's training and experience and the reasonable inferences that 
can be drawn from the facts available to the officer. See United States v. Cortez, 
449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981) ("[A] trained officer draws inferences and makes 
deductions - inferences and deductions that might well elude an untrained 
person .... [T]he evidence ... must be seen and weighed not in terms of library 
analysis by scholars, but as understood by those versed in the field of law 
enforcement."); State v. Roe, 140 Idaho 176, 180, 90 P.3d 926, 930 (Ct. App. 
2004) ("An officer may draw reasonable inferences from the facts in his or her 
possession, and those inferences may be drawn from the officer's experience 
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and law enforcement training."). "Whether an officer possessed reasonable 
suspicion is evaluated based on the totality of the circumstances known to the 
officer at or before the time of the stop." Bishop, 146 Idaho at 811, 203 P.3d at 
1210 (citations omitted). 
Here, the officer had information that Friedrich had a suspended driver's 
license and had been driving on the suspended license one week earlier. (Tr., 
p.17, L.5 - p.19, L.21.) The officer also knew where Friedrich lived and what 
kind of vehicle he drove in addition to knowing what he looked like from prior 
contacts with Friedrich. (Tr., p.16, Ls.17-22; p.20, L.24 - p.21, L.4; p.23, Ls.11-
25.) Armed with this information, the officer parked on Friedrich's street after 
determining Friedrich's car was not in his driveway. (Tr., p.21, L.17 - p.22, L. 13.) 
The officer observed a car that looked like Friedrich's car drive toward Friedrich's 
house and park in Friedrich driveway. (Tr., p.22, L.14 - P. 23, L.25.) Believing it 
was Friedrich and observing the vehicle fishtail on the icy road, the officer "pulled 
up into his driveway behind his vehicle and initiated a traffic stop." (Tr., p.24, 
Ls.22-23.) When the officer walked up to the vehicle and turned his spotlight on 
the driver, he was able to confirm the driver was in fact Friedrich. (Tr., p.31, 
Ls.10-17.) 
Friedrich contends on appeal that this initial approach by the officer was 
unlawful, claiming that at or before the officer initiated the detention of Friedrich, 
"he had no information upon which he could base a reasonable suspicion that 
this driver was driving contrary to the law, and thus, had no reasonable suspicion 
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upon which to justify a warrantless detention of that driver." (Appellant's brief, 
p.10.) Friedrich is incorrect. 
Although the district court incorrectly concluded there was no traffic stop 
because Friedrich had pulled into his own driveway1 (Tr., p.46, Ls.10-12), it 
correctly identified the information supporting reasonable suspicion available to 
the officer at the time he approached Friedrich in his driveway: 
I also find that what happened was in this case, and it's not 
remarkable, it happens in many cases, is that the officer in this 
case had been briefed by other officers that the defendant was 
driving on a suspended license out of Oregon. 
The officer does have an understanding of where the 
defendant lives and what his vehicle looks like, and as a result of a 
prior week's contact, they do have information on a car being 
registered to this particular defendant. 
So when the officer sees him driving and drives up behind 
him and shines his spotlight and confirms that the driver is the 
driver that the officer knows is operating on a suspended license, 
there's no problem whatsoever with him taking him into custody, 
because there is probable cause to arrest this defendant at that 
point on driving while his driving privileges are suspended. 
(Tr., p.46, L.13 - p.47, L.6.) 
The information known to the officer gave him reasonable suspicion to 
believe Friedrich was driving with a suspended driver's license. Although the 
officer was not able to positively identify Friedrich until after he had activated his 
overhead lights, he knew that Friedrich had, just one week earlier, been driving a 
vehicle that matched the description of the vehicle he saw pulling into Friedrich's 
driveway. The officer also knew Friedrich's driver's license was suspended. The 
1 Although the district court found there was no traffic stop, the state concedes 
the officer did detain Friedrich when he angled his patrol vehicle in the driveway 
behind Friedrich and activated his overhead lights. (Tr., p.35, Ls.1-12.) 
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totality of the circumstances known to the officer justified a temporary detention 
to confirm or dispel the officer's suspicion that Friedrich was indeed the driver 
and was driving without a valid license. 
Friedrich asserts the "officer did not premise the detention of Mr. Friedrich 
on the status of his driver's license, [so] it should not be considered as a potential 
basis upon which to justify the stop." (Appellant's brief, p.15.) This argument 
fails for two reasons. First, the presence of reasonable suspicion is an objective 
test that does not depend on the individual officer's subjective thought processes. 
State v. Willoughby, 147 Idaho 482, 489, 211 P.3d 91, 98 (2009) (citing Deen v. 
State, 131 Idaho 435, 436, 958 P.2d 592, 593 (1998)); see also Whren v. United 
States, 517 U.S. 806, 812-813 (1996). Second, the officer did premise his 
detention on the status of Friedrich's driver's license. The officer testified that 
Friedrich's driving status was the very reason he was in Friedrich's neighborhood 
that evening (see Tr., p.20, L.1 - p.22, L.13) and approached him in his driveway 
after observing his driving pattern2 in addition to the knowledge of Friedrich's 
license suspension: 
Q. [by defense counsel]: Go over a couple things with you here. 
The only reason you made contact with the vehicle was because of 
the fishtail; correct? 
A. And I was pretty sure that it was Mr. Friedrich driving the 
vehicle, and still knowing that he was suspended. 
2 The district court determined "5 to 10 miles an hour is quite a reasonable way to 
handle the snow" (Tr., p.14, Ls.22-23) in finding the officer did not have 
reasonable suspicion that Friedrich was operating the vehicle in an unsafe 
manner. The state does not challenge this conclusion. 
8 
(Tr., p.28, Ls.18-23.) Although Friedrich attempted to impeach the officer's 
testimony with his prior testimony from the preliminary hearing, the officer 
testified as to his knowledge of Friedrich's suspension then as well: 
Q. [by defense counsel]: Was that the only reason you made 
contact with the vehicle at that time, then, was because you saw 
the fishtailing? 
A. Was it the only reason? 
Q. Yes. 
A. Well, I actually knew that the defendant lived there, and -
but, yes, that was the violation, why I stopped him and made 
contact with him. 
(PH Tr., p.10, L.24 - p.11, L.7.) This testimony is not conflicting. The officer was 
in Friedrich's neighborhood the night of his arrest to see if he was again driving 
with a suspended license after having avoided being charged with driving on a 
suspended license a week earlier. The officer saw Friedrich's vehicle 
approaching Friedrich's house in what he deemed to be an unsafe manner. With 
that and the knowledge that Friedrich's driver's license was suspended, the 
officer had reasonable suspicion to briefly detain him in order positively identify 
him and confirm his driving status. 
Friedrich has failed to establish that the district court erred in denying his 
motion to suppress. 
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11. 
Freid rich Has Failed To Establish An Abuse Of The Sentencing Court's 
Discretion 
A Introduction 
Friedrich argues the district court abused its discretion in imposing 
concurrent sentences of three years fixed followed by seven years indeterminate 
on each of Friedrich's felony convictions, claiming the court "imposed both 
sentences without sufficiently considering the recognized sentencing objectives 
or the mitigation factors present in this case." (Appellant's brief, p.17.) Friedrich 
has failed to meet his burden of establishing the excessiveness of his sentences 
and has thereby failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion. 
B. Standard Of Review 
When a defendant alleges an excessive sentence on appeal, the appellate 
court independently reviews "all of the facts and circumstances of the case" and 
considers the nature of the offense and the character of the offender. State v. 
Cope, 142 Idaho 492, 500, 129 P.3d 1241, 1249 (2006). To prevail, the 
appellant must establish that, under any reasonable view of the facts, the 
sentence is excessive considering the objectives of criminal punishment. Cope, 
142 Idaho at 500, 129 P.3d at 1249. Those objectives are "(1) protection of 
society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) the 
possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for wrongdoing." 
State v. Stover, 140 Idaho 927, 933, 104 P.3d 969, 975 (2005). The fixed portion 
of the sentence is considered the probable duration of confinement. State v. 
10 
Sanchez, 115 Idaho 776, 777, 769 P.2d 1148, 1149 (Ct. App. 1989). A sentence 
that does not exceed the statutory maximum will not be disturbed on appeal 
absent a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771, 772, 653 
P.2d 1183, 1184 (Ct. App. 1982). Where reasonable minds might differ as to the 
length of sentence, the appellate court will not substitute its view for that of the 
sentencing court. State v. Brown, 121 Idaho 385, 393, 825 P.2d 482, 490 
(1992). 
C. Friedrich Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its 
Discretion In Sentencing 
To establish that his sentences are excessive, Friedrich must demonstrate 
that reasonable minds could not conclude the sentence was appropriate to 
accomplish the sentencing goals of protecting society, deterrence, rehabilitation, 
and punishment or retribution. In this case, the district court noted in sentencing 
Friedrich that it had little faith in his self-proclaimed ability to successfully 
complete a second lifetime retained jurisdiction program where 
the reality is, you are coming before the court on a fifth felony, and 
you have multiple misdemeanors on your record, and you have a 
juvenile record, and so the evidence in this file is - doesn't back up 
a person that the court should have confidence about. 
The evidence in the file is also that you were paroled 
multiple times, and you violated your parole multiple times. So the 
evidence - the honest truth is, the evidence is not there to back up 
what you are saying, that you see things differently. 
(Tr., p.86, L.15 - p.87, L.2.) The district court discussed at length Friedrich's 
previous opportunities for rehabilitation and the lack of an actual desire or ability 
to change his ways based on the observations of his past behavior. (See Tr., 
11 
p.86, L.15 - p.89, L.16.) The court also determined there was a need for a 
punishment while acknowledging the possibility of future change: 
And so I do think that a penalty is appropriate. I don't think 
that I could say from any evidence before me that you are at a point 
of change, but I don't preclude the fact that you might be moving to 
that place where you are, so - but I think you are going to have to 
spend a lot more work on changing directions, not just talking about 
changing directions. 
(Tr., p.90, Ls.3-10.) In imposing sentence, the district court mentioned the 
support Friedrich had in his life (Tr., p.90, Ls.22-25) and gave him the opportunity 
to advance his rehabilitation by recommending he be placed in the Therapeutic 
Community (Tr., p.90, Ls.16-21 ). 
The district court's concurrent unified sentences of 10 years with three 
years fixed for Friedrich's convictions for driving under the influence and grand 
theft were entirely reasonable in light of the nature of the crimes, Friedrich's 
significant criminal record, and his lack of amenability to rehabilitation. Friedrich 
has failed to show that the district court abused its sentencing discretion. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court's 
denial of Friedrich's motion to suppress and to uphold Friedrich's judgments of 
conviction and sentences. 
Dated this 30th day of January 2013. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 30th day of JANUARY 2013 served a 
true and correct copy of the attached RESPONDENT'S BRIEF by causing a copy 
addressed to: 
BRIAN R DICKSON 
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
to be placed in the State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the Idaho 
Supreme Court Clerk's office. 
NLS/pm 
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